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Abstract 
 
One of the pervasive narratives in EU law is that the free movement provisions have significant 
(and problematic) constitutional implications. In consequence, many scholars have offered 
interpretations of free movement that offer a more appropriate constitutional vision of the 
EU. This article suggests – in surveying the case law in diverse areas such as healthcare, labour 
law, and gambling – that we can only fully understand the constitutional quality of the free 
movement provisions if we contextualise their effect within specific and discrete policy 
domains. A genuinely constitutional understanding of free movement ought to judge the 
quality of the jurisprudence of the Court primarily in light of its capacity to attain or 
(conversely) subvert the normative objectives of a certain policy domain. 
 
Introduction  
 
The question regarding the constitutional implications of the free movement provisions has 
been a perennial favourite among academics. This discussion has focused, in general terms, 
on two different but interrelated questions. The first one discusses the vertical division of 
competences between the Member States and the EU: who has the authority to decide certain 
questions that see to the regulation of the market but may impact on non-economic values? 
This question is crucial, as it understands the interaction between free movement and 
national policy choices to be, in essence, about the constitutional arrangement of power 
sharing between the EU and its Member States. It is, ultimately, about the scope of political 
self-determination: should Member States (and their citizens) be free to choose their own 
preferred policy options in regulating railways, vitamins, gambling, euthanasia, or fireworks? 
Or, conversely, does the commitment to the creation of an internal market without borders 
mean that such choices are constrained in reference to economic objectives?  
 
The second question that informs discussions on the constitutional implications of free 
movement is a more explicitly normative one: which rules, values, or principles should 
structure the European market, and which rules, values or principles should be rejected from 
it? This discussion typically suggests that the free movement provisions have reached 
constitutional status – that is, their effect cannot be displaced politically – and that the values 
articulated through the free movement provisions are therefore of a constitutional nature. 
According to this line of reasoning, there are three sources through which norms find 
expression and acceptance in the internal market. First, national norms can be accepted as 
conforming to the values of the internal market and so come to normatively inform the 
internal market. Second, national norms might have to adapt or be altered normatively in 
order to conform to the values of the internal market. Thirdly, national norms can be explicitly 
displaced with reference to an EU-wide or external norm that conforms more closely to the 
idea of an internal market. The management of these norms typically takes place, in the 
Court’s case law, through the principle of proportionality.  
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These two questions are understood to be ‘constitutional’, in other words, because they see 
to the relationship between the EU and its Member States, and see to the core values that 
inform that relationship. These two questions have primarily been analysed in the areas of 
the free movement of goods, within the context of EU citizenship, and in the Viking/Laval 
saga. In all these analyses, much of the discussion has focused on the constitutional 
implications of certain elements of the legal structure of the Court’s case law, such as the 
scope of application of the free movement provisions and the interpretation of the principle 
of proportionality. The constitutional quality of free movement, in other words, has to a large 
extent been derived by the method through which the Court structures the interaction 
between domestic policy norms and the free movement provisions when adjudicating. 
Different constitutional understandings of the nature and scope of EU law can even be read 
into this interaction between free movement and national policy norms. In consequence, and 
as will be discussed in the following section, much of the literature suggests that if we want 
to change the way in which the Court deals with these constitutional questions, we must alter 
the legal structure through which these cases are settled.  
  
This article suggests – in surveying the case law in diverse areas of the freedom to provide 
services – that we can only fully understand the constitutional quality of the free movement 
provisions if we contextualise their effect within specific and discrete policy areas (section 1). 
After all, each policy area will have a different division of competences between the Member 
States and the EU underlying it; and each policy area will pursue different normative 
objectives. Only by looking at the way in which the Court’s case law affects the division of 
authority between the EU and its Member State within a specific policy area, as well as the 
values that are articulated through that case law, can we understand the constitutional 
implications of the Court’s case law. A genuinely constitutional understanding of free 
movement, then, ought to judge the quality of the jurisprudence of the Court in light of its 
capacity to attain or (conversely) subvert the normative objectives of the policy area 
concerned. As will be demonstrated, using as an example the Court’s case law on Article 56 
TFEU within the context of the regulation of labour law, healthcare, and gambling, such a 
prism suggests that the Court’s case law should be incoherent across policy domains and 
should be tailored to specific policy areas, and that the Court is more successful at discharging 
this constitutional task in certain policy areas than in others.  
 
While the substantive regulation in all three areas fall within the competences of the Member 
State, the Court’s case law deals with these policy areas in very different ways. The Court’s 
case law on labour law, for example, challenges and even subverts the normative ambitions 
of domestic legislation, sacrificing standards that protect the worker at the altar of free 
movement (section 2). In its case law on healthcare, on the other hand, the Court is more 
nuanced, to the point where it defends domestic policy ambitions through the interpretation 
of the free movement provisions (section 3). Finally, in the area of gambling, the Court – in a 
very counterintuitive move – uses free movement to enforce the non-economic concerns that 
underlie Member States regulatory choices (section 4). The constitutional quality of the case 
law of the Court, in other words, in areas that fall within the legislative competences of the 
Member States, crucially depends on the extent to which the free movement provisions can 
reflect the normative ambitions that underlie domestic policy choices.  
 
The free movement provisions and the EU’s constitutional order 
 
One of the peculiarities of the EU is that its market freedoms or economic principles have 
constitutional status, and cannot be displaced without altering the Treaty. The usual narrative 
through which this process is described suggests that a combination of revolutionary legal 
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doctrines and political bottlenecks have led to the constitutionalisation of the free movement 
provisions. The most authoritative accounts in this area come from Weiler and Scharpf. 
Weiler’s work highlights the interaction between legal supranationalism and political 
intergovernmentalism.1 The former, centred on the legal doctrines of supremacy and direct 
effect, creates a system of governance that is at once autonomous and restrictive of national 
political actors. As such, this process structures the EU’s (legal) authority around individual 
rights – to the detriment of other institutional actors and values that typically are understood 
to protect more communitarian or political visions of authority.2 Scharpf adds that this process 
has substantive political repercussions. It facilitates negative integration, in the sense of 
striking down domestic regulations in reference to their restrictive effect on transnational 
movement, while joint-decision traps hamstring the re-regulation of these areas on the 
European level. What follows is a vision of the European market that is both depoliticised and 
highly protective of individual economic freedoms (to the detriment of communitarian and 
non-economic values). This means that EU law struggles to limit its jurisdiction to the areas in 
which it has legislative competence. Instead, its economic principles pervade all areas of 
domestic regulation. This also means that EU law has the potential to indirectly recalibrate 
substantive choices on the national level in policy areas that fall outside its direct legislative 
reach. The typical narrative suggests, moreover, that this recalibration is skewed in favour of 
economic freedom, and that, as such, the very structure of European (market) integration 
militates against a more social or inclusive vision of the internal market.  
 
This development can be defended in economic terms (as making the EU more ‘competitive’), 
in institutional terms (as preventing domestic political actors from taking protectionist 
measures) or in political terms (as serving ordo-liberal objectives of freedom from public or 
private power). Most commonly, however, this ‘constitutionalisation’ of the market freedoms 
has been criticised. While such criticism is located (as we shall see) in many different areas of 
the development of the internal market, it generally revolves around two arguments.3 One 
argument suggests that what is problematic is the way in which free movement law skews the 
vertical distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States.4 The problem, 
in simple terms, is that the Court misreads the jurisdictional limitations of the EU project and 
thereby starts engaging in policy domains that ought to be dealt with by the Member States. 
What underlies this criticism, ultimately, is a commitment towards authority and (political) 
self-determination. It suggests that the division of legislative competences in the Treaty serves 
to insulate certain normative or substantive choices from the reach of EU law exactly because 
the EU cannot legitimately make such decisions. Choices that have a redistributive effect, or 
have an ethical or cultural character, on this view, can only legitimately be made if they can 
be traced back to the electorate’s wishes. The sophisticated democratic process that exists on 
the national level, in other words, serves as a ‘safety valve’ to ensure that salient policy choices 
(do we spend €40 billion on healthcare or on education? Do we allow or ban abortion and the 
use of soft drugs?) can be traced back to the normative preferences of the electorate. But the 
democratic process also ensures the legitimacy of substantive policy preferences in other 
ways. First, it legitimises the policy norm itself, by internalising conflict and dissent, while 
allowing for its future renegotiation. Second, it legitimises the coercive authority necessary to 
enforce a certain redistributive or moral standard. Third, it legitimises the political process 
                                                 
1 J. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403. 
2 J. Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma of European Legitimacy’ 
(2014) 12 ICON 94. 
3 Other – more descriptive – criticism includes the coherence of reasoning, use of judicial instruments and tests. 
On this, see N. Nic Shiubhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law (OUP 2013). 
4 Ibid, 10. 
4 
 
itself, as the site through which contested policy orientations are negotiated.5 In other words, 
the Treaty’s commitment to leaving the substantive legislative decisions on how to regulate, 
say, gambling, abortion, or healthcare in the hands of the national political sphere serves to 
ensure that those decisions are legitimate. The Court’s involvement in these policy areas 
through the free movement provisions, then, becomes, in this first argument, problematic 
because it eats away at this legitimacy and authority. In short, the Court’s reading of the free 
movement provisions not only fail to respect the vertical distribution of competences as laid 
down in the Treaty, but, in doing so, undermine the capacity of Member States to freely 
choose how to regulate the policy areas under their control.  
 
The second, related but distict, narrative that criticises the understanding of the free 
movement provisions in the Court’s case law focuses on the substantive implications of the 
process of constitutionalisation, and suggests that the main problem is that the vision of the 
market that emerges is inappropriate for normative reasons.6 Again in simple terms, the 
constitutionalisation process makes the EU’s market too neo-liberal and not sufficiently 
sensitive to broad social or political concerns that may exist on the European or the national 
level.7 The problem here is not so much that the EU’s institutions engage in normatively 
structuring the internal market (as in the first criticism), but that they make substantively 
wrong decisions. This criticism, ultimately, suggests that the Court is structurally biased 
towards certain values that might reflect personal or institutional preferences, particular 
visions of state-market relationships, or (as most commonly argued) a particular vision of the 
extent to which states are allowed to manage economic interactions. This latter line of 
argument suggests that the legal structure through which the Court manages the construction 
of the internal market – which requires non-economic objective to be proportionate in 
reference to the exercise of economic freedom – is inimical to the development of any type 
of internal market that is ‘social’ in a meaningful sense.8 This bias is only magnified when the 
effect of free movement law is understood from the perspective of the capacity of domestic 
actors to maintain their policy commitments towards normative understandings of the market 
that have been articulated within a domestic context, such as, for example, a social market 
economy, or a public healthcare service that is free at point of access. Scholars such as Scharpf 
or Newdick have argued that – when perceived from the domestic perspective – free 
movement undermines both the normative orientation and the institutional infrastructure 
through which such national social preferences are articulated.9  
 
Different suggestions have been made to counter these two nefarious effects of the process 
of constitutionalisation of the free movement provisions – be it on the vertical distribution of 
competences or the normative structure of the internal market. These suggestions are 
premised on very different understandings of where the exact problem lies. Many authors 
suggest that the main problem is the depoliticised nature of the construction of the internal 
market, and in particular the institutional configuration within which the Court has 
                                                 
5 See more in depth, F. De Witte, ‘Sex, Drugs, and EU Law: The Recognition of Moral and Ethical Diversity in EU 
Law’ (2013) 50 CMLR 1548-50.  
6 See for example, R. Bellamy, ‘The Liberty of the Moderns: Market Freedom and Democracy within the EU’ (2012) 
1 Global Constitutionalism 141. 
7 See for example F. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or: Why the EU Cannot be a ‘Social Market 
Economy’ (2010) 8 Socioeconomic Review 218; F. De Witte, ‘The Architecture of the Social Market Economy’, in: P. 
Koutrakos and J. Snell, Research Handbook on the EU’s Internal Market Law (Edgar Elgar 2016). 
8 Schapf, Ibid. 
9 See, for example, F. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration, or: Why the EU Cannot be a ‘Social Market 
Economy’ (2010) 8 Socioeconomic Review 218, with reference to the bias in favour of liberal economies and against 
social market economies; or C. Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Healthcare: Cementing Individual Rights 
by Corroding Social Solidarity’ (2006) 43 CMLR 1645, with reference to a bias against the system operated by the 
British NHS, which is free at the point of access.  
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accumulated judicial power to shape the internal market.10 Davies offers the most lucid 
account, linking the purposive nature of the legislative and judicial construction of the internal 
market (in so far that the goal of economic integration through free movement is never 
questioned or contestable) with the waning social legitimacy of the EU.11 On this view, the 
problem is not only the absence of a mechanism that protects the division of competences 
between the EU and the Member States, but also the absence of political institutions that can 
counterbalance judicial biases,12 making the EU no longer responsive to normative political 
claims articulated by the electorate.13 The solution, here, lies in securing more political control 
over the way in which the free movement provisions operate. Grimm suggests the 
‘deconstitutionalisation’ of the provisions, so that they can be counterbalanced normatively 
by non-economic interests articulated on the European or national level, which would also 
entail a shift in institutional power towards political actors in the EU.14 Scharpf suggests a 
mechanism through which the Member States, acting in concert, can react to the rulings on 
the Court that are thought to be problematic.15 Chalmers more broadly suggests that a 
commitment to democratic authority requires EU law to be more responsive to national 
resistance to the Union’s substantive values and choices.16 All these suggestions attempt to 
address the two problems of the constitutionalisation process simultaneously: securing more 
political control by domestic actors over the way in which free movement operates in the EU 
will ensure that the development of the internal market more closely meets the broad 
normative objectives articulated on the national level. The logic here is that political structures 
are better at securing (substantively) a vision that is normatively appealing to the electorate 
and offer a better forum (institutionally) for contesting or revisiting choices, and for 
responding to new voices.  
 
Other authors have suggested that the source of the problem of constitutionalisation and 
depoliticisation of the free movement provisions lays not so much in the institutional structure 
of the Union but primarily in the Court’s understanding of the scope of those provisions.17 
Much of the discussion in this area has focused on the case law of the Court in the context of 
the free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU). The argument here is that the scope of the free 
movement provisions to a large extent determines the balance in the vertical division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States: the wider the scope of Article 34 TFEU, 
the less political autonomy Member States retain (and conversely, the narrower the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU, the wider the autonomy of national actors). As authors such as Maduro and 
Snell have highlighted, different interpretations of the scope of the free movement provisions 
entail different constitutional visions of the appropriate vertical organisation of competences 
in the regulation of the market.18 If the free movement provisions were to catch only 
discriminatory national rules, or rules that have a differentiated impact on domestic and 
                                                 
10 F. Scharpf, Governing in the EU: Effective and Democratic (OUP 1999); S. Garben, ‘Confronting the Competence 
Conundrum: Democratising the European Union through an Expansion of its Legislative Power’ (2015) 35 OJLS 1; 
G. Davies, “Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence” (2015) 21 ELJ 2; M. Bartl, “The 
Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit” (2015) 21 ELJ 23; D. Grimm, ‘The 
Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’ (2015) 21 ELJ 460.  
11 Davies, above, note 10.   
12 See also De Witte, above, note 8 and S. Garben, ‘Balancing ‘the market’ and ‘the social’ in the EU’ (2016) EUConst 
(forthcoming).  
13 Bartl, above, note 10.  
14 Grimm, above, note 10. 
15 F. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy’ (2015) 21 ELJ 384. 
16 D. Chalmers, ‘European Restatements of Sovereignty’ LSE Law Working Paper 10/2013.  
17 D. Ashiagbor, ‘Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the Context of EU 
Market Integration’ (2013) 19 ELJ 310-11. 
18 M. P. Maduro, We, the Court (Hart 1996); J. Snell, ‘The Internal Market and the Philosophies of Market 
Integration’ in C. Barnard and S. Peers, European Union Law (OUP 2014).  
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foreign products or producers; Member States and political actors would retain a significant 
margin of autonomy in regulating the market in accordance with their social, cultural or moral 
preferences. If, instead, indistinctly applicable rules (that do not distinguish between domestic 
and foreign products or producers, but limit the overall amount of products sold) are also 
caught; Member State retain very little autonomy in deciding how to embed economic 
transactions with a view to protect non-economic concerns.19  
 
The question to what extent the principle of mutual recognition should guide the Court’s 
reading of the scope of the free movement provisions is a perfect example of this type of 
argument. Critics of such a wide interpretation of the scope of application of the free 
movement provisions use its constitutional implications to counsel against it. AG Tizzano has 
perhaps put it most clearly in Caixa Bank. He first highlights the importance of the vertical 
distribution of competences for the way in which we should think about the scope of free 
movement: ‘where harmonisation has not taken place, Member States remain as a matter of 
principle competent to regulate the pursuit of economic activities, by means of non-
discriminatory measures’.20 A wide reading of the free movement provisions, however, ‘would 
permit economic operators (..) to abuse Article [56 TFEU] in order to oppose any national 
measure that (..) could narrow profit margins and hence reduce the attractiveness of pursuing 
a particular activity’.21 Such a wide reading is not only problematic from the perspective of the 
vertical division of competences, Tizzano argues, but also has a significant normative 
implication for the type of market that emerges in the EU: ‘that would be tantamount to 
bending the Treaty to a purpose for which it was not intended: that is to say, not to create an 
internal market in which conditions are similar to those of a single market and where 
operators can move freely, but in order to establish a market without rules’.22 The scope of 
the free movement provisions, then, directly matters for how we can answer our two 
constitutional questions.   
 
This is also, of course, visible in the Court’s case law on Article 34 TFEU. While the Keck case 
sought to make a formalistic distinction between the type of rules (product requirements) 
that would fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU and the types of rules (selling 
arrangements) that would fall outside that scope in order to clarify the vertical division of 
power between the EU and the Member States in market regulation,23 more recent cases 
suggest that this constitutional awareness of the Court has decreased. In the cases relating to 
national limitations on use of a certain product,24 or the more recent ANETT and Scotch Whisky 
cases, the Court seems primarily preoccupied in extending the scope of Article 34 TFEU so as 
to be able to supervise Member State measures that regulate the market, even if their impact 
on cross-border trade is arguable negligible or non-discriminatory.25 In Scotch Whisky, for 
example, the Court explicitly second-guesses Scottish policy in fighting alcoholism by rejecting 
the Scottish Parliament’s imposition of a minimum prices per unit of alcohol.  
 
Another element in the Court’s case law that has been criticised for having significant 
constitutional implications is the question of the possible horizontal application of the free 
                                                 
19 See also C. Barnard, ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 
575. 
20 AG Tizzano in Case C-442/02, Caixa Bank [2004] ECR I-8961, para 61. 
21 Ibid, para 62. 
22 Ibid, para 63. 
23 Case C-267/91, Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. 
24 See e.g. Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:66; Case C-142/05, Mickelsson & Roos [2009] 
ECR: EU:C:2009:336. 
25 Case C-333/14, Scotch Whisky ECLI:EU:C:2015:845; Case C-456/10, ANETT ECLI:EU:C:2012:241. 
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movement provisions.26 As Schepel has clarified, the acceptance of horizontal effect has direct 
and distinct implications for how we can answer the two constitutional questions set out 
above. He suggests that the horizontal application of the free movement provisions 
introduces a degree of institutional and normative complexity that is very difficult for the 
Court to manage appropriately.27 In consequence, both the normative orientation of the 
internal market, and the respective role of the different institutions (both domestic and EU) 
involved in managing that market becomes deeply contingent on the actions of private actors 
– which in itself subverts the very notion that the appropriate answers to the constitutional 
questions are to be found in the Treaty. The most prominent cases where the horizontal 
application of the free movement provisions has been understood to have constitutional 
implications are of course Viking and Laval.28 The imposition of the obligation on trade unions 
to respect the free movement rights of companies confounds the Court’s capacity to answer 
the constitutional questions. First, the scope of EU law is no longer determined by the Treaty 
but by private action. In consequence, the weighing of (contradictory) normative values is 
taken out of the national political arena, and re-allocated to private actors (albeit supervised 
by the Court). Second, the normative texture of the internal market is no longer developed 
through a commitment to the values that the Union and Member States share, but are instead 
developed through the exercise of movement by private actors. In a sense, and as explored 
more in depth below, the depoliticisation of national labour law policies makes the attainment 
of its normative objectives impossible.29     
 
Finally, some authors have argued that the problems created by the constitutionalisation of 
market freedoms in the EU could be solved by a different use of the principle of 
proportionality, which the Court uses to adjudicate in a case-by-case basis on the relative 
weight of market freedom and non-economic values.30 These legal instruments, after all, 
define to what extent Member State autonomy is respected and which values are allowed to 
inform the structure of the European market. The test of proportionality used by the Court, 
many authors have highlighted, tends to create a bias in favour of free movement (and to the 
detriment of non-economic values) by insisting that the national measure achieves the public 
policy objective in a method that is the least restrictive of free movement possible. These tests 
are very prescriptive, and often have the effect of replacing domestic regulatory standards 
with standards that are set by the Court itself.31 This process has been criticised on account of 
both constitutional questions set above: it re-allocates regulatory power away from domestic 
political actors towards transnational judicial actors; and it introduces a bias in the regulation 
of the internal market which means that it does not necessarily reflect the normative 
understanding of the market by the political actors on the EU and the Member States.32 On 
this account, the keys to improve the constitutional quality of the free movement provisions 
lies not in the institutional structure of the EU, in the legal structure of free movement, or in 
their scope of application, but in the way in which free movement arguments are weighted 
against to non-economic values.33  
 
                                                 
26 Ashiagbor, above, note 17, 311-12. 
27 H.  Schepel, ‘Constitutionalising the Market, Marketing the Constitution, and to Tell the Difference: On the 
Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law’ (2012) 18 ELJ 177. 
28 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767. 
29 See below, section 2.  
30 Barnard, above, note 19. 
31 Nic Shiubhne, above, note 3; De Witte, above, note 5. See also Case C-333/14, Scotch Whisky ECLI:EU:C:2015:845 
32 Ibid. 
33 See for suggestions to this effect, D. Damjanovic, ‘The EU Market Rules as Social Market Rules: Why the EU Can 
Be a Social Market Economy’ (2013) 50 CMLR 1704ff; De Witte, above, note 5. 
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This article suggests that the above approaches to tackling the question of the constitutional 
quality of the free movement provisions offer an incomplete account – not because their 
explanatory accounts are unconvincing or inaccurate, but because of an absence of context. 
In order to understand the constitutional quality of the free movement provisions, context is 
crucial. Two examples might explain why looking at the legal structure of the Court’s case law 
does not suffice. Take the wide scope of the free movement provisions, catching any measure 
alone that makes mobility ‘less attractive’. Is such a reading of the free movement provisions 
constitutionally problematic or not? Surely the answer must depend on whether the domestic 
rule that is challenged relates to (say) telecommunications or drugs policy: in the former policy 
area the EU shares its competences with the Member States, while the latter formally remains 
a domestic policy area. Consequently, stringent oversight by the Court and curtailing domestic 
political autonomy in the former is much less problematic than in the latter example. Or take 
the restrictive interpretation of proportionality, which introduces a bias in favour of free 
movement by insisting on the ‘least restrictive’ alternative available. Is such an interpretation 
constitutionally problematic? Again, the answer depends on the context. Strict proportionality 
might undermine social rights (say, in labour law), but also promote them (in healthcare). The 
normative and constitutional consequences of the case law on free movement, are, in other 
words, not necessarily linked to its legal structure. These examples show that simply looking 
at the legal structure of the case law on free movement cannot, on its own, tell us anything 
conclusive about the constitutional quality of the free movement provisions. These provisions 
can be interpreted to EU to protect, or, conversely, to subvert domestic policy choices. In the 
absence of context, looking at the legal structure of the Court’s case law can tell us something 
about the formalistic coherence of EU law, but not its substantive quality.34 These genuinely 
constitutional questions (the question of vertical allocation of competences, and the 
normative vision of the ‘market’) must also take account of the context of a specific policy 
area. 
 
If we want to assess the constitutional quality of the free movement provisions, we should 
instead narrow our analysis to the way in which the case law of the Court impacts on specific 
policy areas. Different policy areas, after all, will have different vertical division of 
competences between the Member States and the EU, and different normative objectives will 
underlie those different policy areas. One would expect the Court to act differently when it is 
asked to adjudicate on labelling of foodstuffs than when it adjudicates on the compatibility of 
abortion with free movement. In order to discharge its judicial task in a fashion that is 
constitutionally appropriate, the Court needs to be very sensitive to the nuances of the policy 
areas in which it is asked to adjudicate, and the way in which free movement has the potential 
to skew domestic policy preferences in areas that fall outside the legislative competences of 
the EU.  
 
This article suggests that the constitutional quality of EU free movement law depends on the 
case law’s capacity i) to respect and reflect the vertical division of competences in a particular 
policy area, meaning that it ought to identify which legislator (EU or Member States) have the 
authority to decide on policy orientation; and ii) to respect the normative ambitions that 
underlie such policy areas. What these normative ambitions exactly are must be deduced from 
its legislative context – which might be EU legislation (in areas falling within the Union’s 
competences) or domestic legislation (in areas falling outside the Union’s competences). This 
task of identifying normative policy orientations, objectives or goals, is a task that both 
domestic and EU court routinely perform – typically looking beyond the formalistic 
articulation of those objectives in legislation, and taking into account drafting history, 
preambles, and the relationship of separate pieces of legislation to its wider policy context 
                                                 
34 Which itself masks a range of normative and institutional tensions, see Nic Shiubhne, above note 3. 
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and ambitions.35 Such a new constitutional approach in analysing the case law in free 
movement also suggests, of course, that inconsistency across the case law of the Court on 
free movement may not necessarily be a bad thing. What matters less is the procedural 
relationship between free movement and policy (does the Court use similar standards or 
methodology in adjudication?);36 and what matters more is the substantive relationship 
between free movement and policy areas, that is, to what extent free movement case law 
serves to either uphold or subvert the substantive values articulated by the (EU or domestic) 
legislator. Such a contextual approach to understanding the Court’s case law also entails that 
the EU – in areas that fall outside of its competences – must respect domestic policy choices 
not by virtue of their specific normative orientation but simply by virtue of the fact that such 
choices have been made by the domestic political structures. The argument below, 
importantly, does not suggest a normative reorientation of the case law of the Court in order 
to achieve an alternative outcome that is more normatively appealing in substance, but one 
that is more appealing because it respects the authority of the legislative institutions in making 
those decisions.  
  
The following sections analyses the implications of this more contextual approach with 
reference to Article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide services. Article 56 TFEU applies to 
policy areas as diverse as labour law, gambling, healthcare or telecommunication; and it deals 
with different forms of cross-border mobility (of the provider, recipient, or service itself). This 
means that cases coming before the Court under the heading of Article 56 TFEU require 
meticulous contextualisation in order to make sense of the radically different normative 
objectives of these policy areas. The next sections will look at three policy areas that articulate 
salient moral or distributive policy preferences: labour law, healthcare, and gambling. These 
areas are at once radically diverse (in particular in their normative ambitions and structural 
properties) but also very similar (in so far as the substantive regulation of these areas falls 
without doubt in the competences of the Member States). The way in which the internal 
market and free movement provisions interact with these areas, in other words, ought to 
serve to insulate national normative ambitions and choices, not to undermine or skew them. 
The latter outcome would be constitutionally deeply problematic. Looking at the Court’s case 
law in these three areas through the lens of the constitutional framework discussed in this 
section, we realise that the constitutional quality of the Court’s case law radically differs from 
one policy area to the next.  
 
Labour law 
 
The constitutional quality of the Court’s case law where labour law intersects with Article 56 
TFEU is very dubious. The division of competences in this area is clear: Member States are 
solely responsible for the substantive articulation of labour norms (with the exception of 
health and safety measures and non-discrimination measures), while EU law – and specifically 
the Posted Workers Directive 96/71 – serves as a conflict of law rule, allocating which Member 
State is allowed to impose its labour norms on which actors. Article 153 TFEU, in fact, explicitly 
                                                 
35 See, in the context of the EU, for example J. Komarek, ‘Legal Reasoning in EU Law’, in D. Chalmers and A. Arnull, 
The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2016); G.  Itzcovich, ‘The Interpretation of Community 
Law by the European Court of Justice’ (2011) 10 GLJ 537. Cases in which the Court has recently and explicitly 
engaged in these practices are Case C-370/12, Pringle ECLI:EU:C:2012:756; or Case C-583/11P, Inuit 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:625.   
36 This is not to say that the methodology does not matter. As Nic Shiubhne and Maci highlight, changes to the 
Court’s use of evidence, for example, has vast implications for the constitutional questions discussed here, as well 
as the quality of the internal reasoning of the Court. See N. Nic Shiubhne and M. Maci, ‘Proving Public Interest: The 
Growing Impact of Evidence in Free Movement Case Law (2013) 50 CMLR 965  
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highlights that “the Union shall support and complement the activities of the Member States” 
in social policy, explicitly excluding any harmonisation other than the setting of minimum 
standards (from which Member States are free to deviate upwards),37 and, in Article 153 (5) 
TFEU, explicitly ringfencing the regulation of pay, the right to association, and the right to 
strike, from EU legislative action. In other words, the Treaty is clear about the division of 
competences in labour law: Member States are solely responsible for the expression of when, 
why, and how workers ought to be protected from the asymmetric power advantage of their 
employers. This is not particularly surprising. The purpose of labour law, after all, requires 
both the politicisation of the substance of labour norms and the incapacity for workers and 
companies to contract out of such protective measures (that is, the compulsory territorial 
adherence to labour law norms). The EU, on the other hand (at least when one reads the 
Treaty provisions) is normatively neutral in the substantive regulation of the employment 
relationship: it does not express any particular substantive vision of what justice is and 
requires in the employment relationship.  
 
The Court’s engagement with the area of labour law in its case law on free movement, 
however, does not respect this constitutional balance. A brief overview of the case law of the 
Court, starting with Rush Portuguesa38 and finding its end (for the moment) with 
Elektroboduwa and Regiopost,39 highlights the Court’s reluctance to accept that Member 
States are allowed to impose their own labour norms on (temporarily) resident workers. This 
case law, as will be discussed below, indicates that the Court is more interested in subverting 
domestic policy choices than protecting them. 
 
The normative objectives underlying all labour law regimes on the national level – throughout 
the EU – are generally considered to be the balancing of power between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’ 
or, more practically, between workers and their employers. This normative objective became 
crucially important in the aftermath of the period of industrialisation in the late 1800s, which 
led to a big power asymmetry between labour and capital, to the exploitation of large groups 
of workers, and to social unrest that had to be institutionalised politically.40 Labour laws were 
created in order to regulate the interaction between the actors in the productive process in a 
way that is dictated not just by their economic position, but also in reference to commitments 
to justice and equality. Labour law, as such, attempts to correct both a structural and 
substantive problem. In structural terms, it attempts to correct the vast (economic) power 
asymmetry between labour and capital by altering the form and forum of their interaction.41 
It suggests that the limits to, or conditions for, competitive contracting should not be decided 
on the basis of the relative economic power of the market participants, but is to be decided 
in the political forum where their voices are more equal. The political process, in other words, 
serves to correct and stabilise capitalist processes,42 and as such creates what Streeck calls 
democratic capitalism: a structural commitment to discipline capitalist forces in accordance 
to ideas of justice.43 In substantive terms, labour law seeks to prevent the exploitation and 
commodification of the worker. Labour law, in a sense, offers workers better conditions of 
                                                 
37 The logic of minimum (also known as reflexive) harmonisation is to explicitly allow for upward deviation by the 
Member States, and prevent the possible effect of regulatory competition. See S. Deakin, ‘Legal Diversity and 
Regulatory Competition: Which Model for the EU?’ (2006) 12 ELJ 448.  
38 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417. 
39 Case C-396/13, Elektroboduwa ECLI:EU:C:2015:86; and Case C-115/14, Regiopost ECLI:EU:C:2015:760. 
40 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (MacMillan 1975), 22-23. See also S. Webb and B. Webb, 
Industrial Democracy (MacMillan 2003), 654-60. 
41 W. Streeck, ‘Citizenship Under Regime Competition: The Case of the “European Works Councils”’, (1997) 1 EIoP 
No. 5, 3.See for an econometric discussion: P. Cahuc, F. Postel-Vinay and J-M. Robin, ‘Wage Bargaining with on-
the-job Search: Theory and Evidence’, (2006) 74 Econometria 323-364. 
42 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon 2002). 
43 W. Streeck, ‘The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism’ (2011) 71 New Left Review 26. 
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work in return for their acceptance of the fact that the meritocratic logic of the market 
dictates the quality of their life. As such, it sets, for example, rules that regulate the health 
and well-being of workers, minimum rates of payment or holiday, or schemes to protect them 
in case of redundancies. 
 
Both the structural and substantive normative objective that underlies labour law regimes are 
implemented by the principle of territoriality, that is, by making adherence compulsory: 
“protected by means of public authority, [labour norms] are supposed to be non-negotiable 
between the labor market participants to which they apply, insulating them against the impact 
of differences in bargaining power. For example, just as workers cannot sell their right to 
bargain collectively, or agree to work for less than the minimum wage, employers are not 
allowed to buy themselves out of their obligation to consult.”44 This suggests that the 
normative objectives of labour law are based on a precarious institutional framework: without 
a political process that can even out power asymmetries, and without the principle of 
territoriality that makes certain substantive labour standards compulsory, the normative 
objectives or labour law cannot be achieved.45  
 
In light of this intimate connection between the production of labour law norms and the 
institutional framework that implements it, it is unsurprising that competences in labour law 
have remained on the national level. It is equally unsurprising that labour lawyers have been 
preoccupied with how the development of the internal market would impact on the capacity 
of the Member States to autonomously regulate the employment relationship and the limits 
to (and conditions of) competitive contracting within their territory. The twin processes of 
negative integration and regulatory competition suggest that the internal market could be a 
possible threat to national labour law: by disembedding the interaction between ‘capital’ and 
‘labour’ from the domestic political setting, or challenging the principle of territoriality, the 
dynamics of the internal market could introduce a bias in favour of the former.46 In other 
words, for the Court to engage with labour law in a constitutionally appropriate fashion, and 
to respect and reinforce the normative objectives underlying labour law (rather than subvert 
them), the Court ought to be sensitive both to the autonomy of the national political process 
as the site for the elaboration of labour norms, and to the substance and nature of those 
norms, which require compulsory and territorial adherence.  
 
A brief perusal of the Court’s case law on the interaction between labour law and free 
movement indicates a worrying level of incoherence. In a first range of cases – including Seco, 
Rush Portuguesa and Van der Elst47 – the Court seemed to be sensitive to the need to protect 
political autonomy in norm-setting, and allowed Member States to extend labour norms to all 
workers on its territory, even if temporarily present in the context of the posting of workers: 
“[Union] law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective 
labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry relating to minimum wages, to any 
person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country 
the employer is established”.48 This understanding of the interaction between labour law and 
free movement is constitutionally appropriate: the Court respects the substantive division of 
                                                 
44 W. Streeck, ‘Citizenship Under Regime Competition: The Case of the “European Works Councils”’, (1997) 1 EIoP 
No. 5, 3. 
45 See for a more elaborate account, F. De Witte, ‘EU Law, Politics and the Social Question’ (2013) 14 GLJ 591.  
46 Ashiagbor, note 17, 309. 
47 Joined Cases 62/81 and 63/81, Seco [1982] ECR 223; Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417; Case C-
43/93, Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-8303. 
48 Case C-43/93, Van der Elst [1994] ECR I-8303, para 23 – the court later nuanced this statement to the effect that 
only those norms that protect the worker and are not enforced in home state could be demanded. See F. De Witte, 
Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (OUP 2015) 104ff. 
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competences between the EU and its Member States and strengthens the capacity of Member 
States to meet the normative objectives of labour law – that is, to prevent the exploitation 
and commodification of the workforce. These rulings were codified in the Posting of Workers’ 
Directive 96/71, which took most labour law norms ‘out of competition’ by allowing Member 
States to make adherence on their territory compulsory,49 and explicitly allowed for the 
imposition of conditions of employment on temporarily present workers “which are more 
favourable to workers” than in the workers’ home state.50 In other words, this first line of 
cases on the interaction between labour law and the internal market suggests that free 
movement law respects the normative objectives of national labour law regimes.  
 
EU lawyers will all know how the story continues. In a series of rulings in Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
and Commission v Luxembourg, the Court understood the interaction between labour law and 
free movement to require the exact opposite outcome: Directive 96/71 “cannot be 
interpreted as allowing the host Member State to make the provision of services in its territory 
conditional on the observance of terms and conditions of employment which go beyond the 
mandatory rules for minimum protection”.51 In these rulings, the Court allows temporarily 
present workers to work under a regime that combines the rules of their home state with the 
bare minimum rules that apply in the host state. In other words, they do not work under the 
conditions that a comparable host state worker works under, but instead under the lowest 
conditions available in the host state. Rather than seeing national minimum labour conditions 
as a floor under which the conditions of employment become normatively problematic, the 
Court sees such conditions as a ceiling: companies posting workers abroad cannot be made to 
comply with higher standards. These same problems are also present in the (lack of) capacity 
of trade unions to strike in support of their employment rights in case of transnational 
movement of competitors of employer.52  
 
These rulings are constitutionally deeply problematic; primarily in so far as EU law challenges 
the normative objectives of labour law rather than insulating them. This is premised on three 
fundamental misconceptions about the structure and purpose of labour law that are implicit 
in the Court’s case law. The first – and most evident – is that the Court, in arguing that the 
interests of both home state service providers and their workers are affected by the 
imposition of labour conditions by the host state,53 seems to think that any work is beneficial 
for posted workers, rather than work undertaken under conditions of fairness and justice. This 
is to fundamentally misunderstand the power asymmetry that is at the basis of the 
employment relationship. Second, the application of the free movement provisions to trade 
unions (that is, their horizontal application) presumes that trade unions act in the public 
interest (as their actions can only be justified as such), while capital acts out of private 
interests in using the free movement provisions. The result is that the Court demands that the 
weaker party to the employment relationship must take the interests of the stronger party 
into account when acting. It goes without saying that this turns the normative premise of 
labour law on its head: it presumes that capital needs to be protected from the power 
advantage that labour has! Third, the Court, in engaging substantively with the normative 
question how ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ ought to relate with each other – whether within the 
context of posting of workers or the right to collective action – is taking these questions 
                                                 
49 P. Davies, ‘Posted Workers: Single Market or Protection of National Labour Law Systems?’ (1997) 34 CLMR 571. 
50 Article 3 (7) and recital 17 to Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers. In later case law, the Court took this to 
mean conditions more favourable in the workers’ home state, as if the purpose of the PWD is to protect 
Luxembourg workers that work in Bulgaria, rather than the other way around. See Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR 
I-11767, para 80-81. 
51 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para 80; Case C-C-346/06 Ruffert [2008] ECR I-1989, para 33.  
52 K. Apps, ‘Damages Claims against Trade Unions after Viking and Laval’ (2009) 34 ELRev 141. 
53 Case C-341/05, Laval [2005] ECR I-11767, para 58. 
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outside the scope of politics. The same applies when it demands that labour take account of 
the interests of capital in exercising the right to collective action.  
 
The Court, here, clearly underestimates the extent to which the political embedding of these 
questions is vital to level out the power advantage of capital and attain the normative 
objectives of labour law. The political nature of the interaction between labour and capital 
served exactly the purpose of evening out the power asymmetries between them. All in all, 
this second line of cases on the interaction between labour law and free movement indicates 
significant constitutional problems: it undermines the attainment of the normative objectives 
of labour law not only in a structural manner – by depoliticising its development – but also in 
a substantive manner – by limiting the territorial and compulsory adherence which protects 
labour from the power advantage of capital. Rather than respecting and insulating the 
normative objectives of labour law, then, the Court subverts them, and exposes the worker 
to the full force of capital.  
 
In more recent cases such as Elektroboduwa and Regiopost54 the Court seems to somewhat 
come to its constitutional senses, and to respond to the avalanche of criticism that followed 
the cases listed above.55 Elektroboduwa concerned a conflict between Polish workers and 
their employer over the conditions for work while posted in Finland. More specifically, it dealt 
with the applicable law that governs payment disputes (on which Directive 96/71 is silent) and 
whether the notion of ‘minimum wage’ that Finland was allowed to impose on the Polish 
employer includes accommodation, transport and food (as it did under the Finnish sectoral 
trade agreement) or ought to be limited to rates of pay alone.56 The Court first held that 
payment disputes could be assigned to trade unions (as Finnish law allowed but Polish law did 
not). This is an encouraging sign, in so far as it suggests that host states can impose procedural 
standards that protect the worker in the host state.57 The Court then – in a surprising move – 
substantively defined ‘minimum rates of pay’ in a manner that allowed differentiation based 
on qualifications, experience, training and type of work, that included a daily allowance, 
reimbursement for travelling time, and that prevented the employer from deducing costs of 
accommodation and food while posted.58 In short, the Court allowed the Finnish sectoral 
labour agreement to (very) broadly define ‘minimum rates of pay’ and impose these 
obligations on temporary employment relationships within its territory. Even if the full extent 
to which it goes back on previous case law is unclear,59 Elektroboduwa seems to carve out 
more regulatory autonomy for host state. Even though the Court does not formally 
acknowledge the regulatory autonomy of Finland to impose its own, political, understanding 
of the appropriate limits to (and conditions of) employment to all workers present on its 
territory; it does signal a more sensitive approach to the capacity of free movement to 
undercut the normative objectives of labour law. As such, it seems that the Court is slowly 
turning to an interpretation of the interaction between labour law and free movement that is 
more constitutionally coherent. It is to be hoped that in future cases the Court is more 
sensitive to the structure, nature, and normative objectives of labour law.   
 
In doing so, the Court might be helped by the Union legislator. It is not particularly surprising 
that it has been political actors that understand the negative consequences of the Court’s case 
                                                 
54 Case C-396/13, Elektroboduwa ECLI:EU:C:2015:86; and Case C-115/14, Regiopost ECLI:EU:C:2015:760. 
55 See, for example, Garben, above note 12. 
56 Case C-396/13, Elektroboduwa ECLI:EU:C:2015:86, para 14-18. 
57 Case C-396/13, Elektroboduwa ECLI:EU:C:2015:86, para 19-26. 
58 Case C-396/13, Elektroboduwa ECLI:EU:C:2015:86, para 38-69. 
59 Garben, above note 12. 
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law.60 Politics, after all, is sensitive to power asymmetries and emerging claims of injustice. 
The Commission’s 2016 work programme includes both ‘a targeted review of the Posting of 
Workers’ Directive’ and the construction of a ‘pillar of social rights’,61 both of which are 
expected to address the way in which the dynamics of the internal market affects the capacity 
of labour law to embed the employment relationship in ways that prevent the exploitation 
and commodification of the worker.62 The legislative proposal on revision of the Posting of 
Workers’ Directive, for example, is premised on the principle of ‘same work same pay’ and 
suggests altering the wording of the Directive to that the host state is allowed to impose all 
legislation concerning remuneration on posted workers.63 This, again, would go some way 
towards structuring the interaction between free movement and labour law in a manner that 
facilitates the attainment of the latter’s objectives, rather than obstruct it. At the same time, 
this proposal has been ‘yellow carded’ by national parliaments, not on the basis of subsidiarity, 
but on the basis of the desire by central and eastern European Member States to preserve a 
substantive status quo that is in their favour.64 
 
In the area of labour law, the constitutional quality of the case law of the Court is very dubious. 
Its case law has challenged both the structural manner in which labour law functions (by 
depoliticising it) as well as its substantive and normative commitment to prevent capital from 
exploiting the power advantage that it has over workers. Rather than insulating domestic 
normative preferences as to the interaction between labour and capital, then, the case law of 
the Court subverts such preferences. This is constitutionally problematic given that the 
division of competences clearly allocates such decisions to domestic legislatures.  
 
Healthcare  
 
The Court’s case law on the interaction between the free movement provisions and national 
healthcare policies is quite nuanced, and pays close attention to the particularities and logic 
of national healthcare choices. The Union’s competence in healthcare is not dissimilar from 
the one in labour law. While Article 168 TFEU allows the EU to support and complement 
national legislation, it also explicitly highlights that “Union action shall respect the 
responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the 
organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the 
Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care and the 
allocation of the resources assigned to them”. In other words, Member States remain 
responsible for the choice how to run and organise their domestic health system; while EU 
law is normatively neutral: it does not suggest a particular understanding of justice or 
solidarity in the provision of healthcare within or across borders. The Court’s case law, in 
healthcare, has a completely different effect when compared to the case law discussed in the 
previous section. In its case law on cross-border healthcare, the Court respects and even 
reinforces the normative and substantive political choices made on the national level. While 
                                                 
60 See the resistance against the codification of the status quo in Viking and Laval through the ‘yellow-carding’ of 
the Monti II proposals: F. Fabbrini and K. Granat, ‘Yellow Card but No Foul: The Role of National Parliaments under 
the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for an EU Regulation of the Right to Strike’ (2013) 50 CMLR 
115. 
61 Commission Work Programme 2016, ‘No time for business as usual’ COM (2015) 610 final.  
62 Garben, above note 12; speech by the Commissioner Marianne Thyssen presenting the EU’s social package, ‘First 
Outline of the European Pillar of Social Rights and reform of the Posting of Workers Directive’ 18 March 2016, 
Speech/16/682, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-682_en.htm  
63 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers, COM (2016) 128 final, 7. 
64 http://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/national-parliaments-invoke-yellow-card-in-
response-to-revised-posted-workers-directive/  
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in the area of labour law, then, the Court’s case law obstructs the attainment of the normative 
objectives of that policy area, in the area of healthcare the Court defends those objectives. 
 
Healthcare policy – in every Member State – is based on a fundamental distinction between 
two very different normative objectives. On the one hand, healthcare policies are meant to 
protect citizens and prevent their premature death. This type of healthcare is often called 
‘primary healthcare’ and is understood as a basic social provision that is extended to all 
residents, visitors or even illegal entrants (which in itself indicates the fundamental nature of 
its provision). Treatments such as antenatal care, severe mental illness, treatment of 
infectious diseases and emergency healthcare are typically understood to fall within this 
category.65 Domestic healthcare policy choices – be it relating to the mode of financing, modes 
of access, or the use of limited financial, infrastructural or personal resources – in every 
Member State reflect the absolute right for citizens to access healthcare that is crucial and 
elemental to their very survival. This first normative objective underlying healthcare policies 
can, in other words, be understood as the commitment to alleviate medical need.  
 
The second normative basis for the provision of healthcare that we can distinguish is a more 
aspirational element. On this view, healthcare is not about preventing death but about 
improving one’s conditions of life.66 This more aspirational understanding of healthcare may 
include treatment such as eye-laser surgery, programs for healthy eating or stops smoking, 
cosmetic dentistry, removing tonsils or physiotherapy, and, fundamentally, sees to a citizen’s 
choice to improve their health. The aspirational nature of these type of treatments is obvious, 
for example, in so far that they constitute relative (and not absolute) rights, may require 
longer waiting times, are not always delivered under the national health service, or may 
require an additional financial commitment by the patient. On this second view, the extent to 
which healthcare is available for all patients, and the extent to which it is collectively financed, 
depends not on medical need, but on the political choices that underlie domestic healthcare 
policies.  
 
The boundary between these two normative objectives that underlie national healthcare 
policies are, obviously, not clear-cut. This is partially due to medical considerations, but (for 
the sake of our argument) mainly due to the way in which national healthcare policy is 
implemented. Due to the high costs of the provision of (all types of) healthcare, most Member 
States operate a system based on compulsory (semi-public) collective insurance – whereby 
citizens insure themselves and fellow citizens against a number of health risks. The main 
difference between Member States in this regard is how the system is financed: out of general 
taxation, work-related insurance schemes or public schemes. All systems, however, delineate 
the type of treatment options that are available, substantively excluding treatments such as 
cosmetic treatment or dentistry, and excluding treatment received abroad. The logic of this 
latter limit – that patients can only be reimbursed for the healthcare that they receive in the 
territory of the state – is that running a healthcare service requires a significant amount of 
planning, and financial and infrastructural resource allocation, which presumes some capacity 
for the healthcare providers to ‘lock in’ its recipients. If Belgium knows that it has to treat, on 
average, 500 patients with tuberculosis each year, it will provide the resources to do so. If, 
                                                 
65 J. Ruger, Health and Social Justice (OUP 2009) 2-3; Article 7 (3) of the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration on Primary 
Healthcare, which defines primary healthcare as including ‘at least: education concerning prevailing health 
problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them; (…) maternal and child health care, immunisation 
against the major infectious diseases, preventing and control of locally endemic diseases, appropriate treatment 
of common diseases and injuries; and provision of essential drugs’. See also B. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health as a 
Human Right in International Law’ in A. Eide, C. Krause and A. Rosas (eds.) Economic, Cultural and Social Rights 
(Kluwer 2001). 
66 EP Working Paper, ‘Healthcare Systems in the EU: A Comparative Study’ (SACO 101 EN). 
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however, 500 extra patients come in from the Netherlands, or, conversely, all 500 Belgian 
patients decide to be treated in France; the Belgian healthcare service either has insufficient 
beds, or wastes significant resources.67 The capacity to ‘lock in’ patients, then, allows a 
Member State to implement its normative healthcare objectives. 
 
National healthcare policy, to sum up, fulfils two very distinct normative objectives (one going 
to the medical need to protect the fragility of the human body, and the other to a patient’s 
choice to work for its improvement) and is institutionalised across the EU in a contractual and 
territorial fashion – which appears on first sight to sit uneasily with free movement. The 
structure of healthcare, in other words, is not dissimilar as the one discussed in reference to 
labour law, above: the territorial and compulsory nature of the implementation of healthcare 
is directly relevant for its capacity to achieve the normative objectives. Free movement of 
patients (with the capacity to ‘export’ their reimbursement schemes), on this account, could 
diminish the capacity of Member States to ensure access to adequate healthcare for its 
immobile citizens by creating financial and infrastructural pressures.  
 
It is argued that the case law of the Court (and the subsequent codification by the Union 
legislator) prevents this from happening by paying close attention to the normative objectives 
underlying healthcare policy on the national level. The Court in fact carries over the central 
distinction between, on the one hand, healthcare as need, and, on the other hand, healthcare 
as choice. The Court distinguishes between an absolute obligation of reimbursement for 
treatment received abroad (where healthcare is based on need), and a relative obligation of 
reimbursement for treatment based on the patient’s choice rather than medical need. In 
doing so, the Court insulates these national policy ambitions, and gives them a cross-national 
scope of application.  
 
In cases such as Watts and Elchinov, and more explicitly Petru,68 the Court deals with patients 
that argued that cross-border treatment should be reimbursed by their own state because the 
treatment available in their own state was inadequate to their medical need. Watts, for 
example, dealt with a patient in need of a hip replacement, that left her in considerable pain 
and unable to work. Instead of waiting for six months (under the British NHS) she chose to be 
treated in France (where no waiting list existed). Elchinov dealt with a Bulgarian patient who 
was treated in Germany for an eye injury (with the only available treatment at home being 
the removal of the eye!); while Petru dealt with a Romanian national who underwent open 
heart surgery in Germany on account of her lack of trust in the hospital in Timişoara, which 
lacked certain basic medical and infrastructural resources. In all three cases, the logic 
underlying the patients’ claims was that their own Member State had reneged on the 
normative promise to prevent medical need. While formally all these cases dealt with the 
question whether the treatments fell within the ‘basket of healthcare’ offered to patients in 
their home state, the Court implicitly (and explicitly in Petru) deals with the normative 
conditions under which healthcare ought to be provided by the Member States. In other 
words, the Court here assesses what the normative promise to prevent medical need, that 
underlies national healthcare policies, means in practice.  
 
In Petru, the Court stresses that “authorisation [to seek healthcare abroad] cannot be refused 
if the same or equally effective treatment cannot be given in good time in the Member State 
of residence of the person concerned”,69 which depends on “the patient’s medical condition” 
                                                 
67 See for more, F. De Witte, Justice in the EU (OUP 2015), sections 3.4 and 4.3.1. 
68 Case C-372/01, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325, Case C-173/09, Elchinov [2010] ECR I-8889, Case C-268/13, Petru 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2271. 
69 Case C-268/13, Petru ECLI:EU:C:2014:2271 para 31. 
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and the “lack of medication and of medical supplies and infrastructure” in that Member 
State.70 This individual assessment – which can also be traced in Elchinov and Watts71 - 
whereby the Court pays close attention to the pathological situation in which the patient finds 
him or herself, and the exact time frame within which treatment can be obtained in the 
patient’s home state, suggests that the Court is willing to reinforce the normative obligation 
of primary healthcare even against the citizens’ own state. In other words – the Court insulates 
the underlying domestic normative aims of a certain policy area rather than subverting it. It is 
granting all European citizens a right to adequate primary healthcare that can be enforced 
against their own state in case the latter fails to provide such healthcare. Or, to turn it around, 
it is creating an incentive for Member States to ensure that their provision of primary 
healthcare meets the basic standards that the normative objectives of healthcare imply. This 
obligation, as the Court highlighted in Petru in response to the observations of the UK and 
Romania, must be understood to see to the capacity of the overall healthcare system to offer 
the medical treatments that meet the patients’ primary health concerns (as distinct from the 
capacity of an particular hospital to do so).72 In these situations, it is clear that free movement 
law may lead to financial and infrastructural pressures on the Member States (as they are 
potentially forced to pay out for (more expensive) treatments obtained abroad). Yet, arguably 
this is only so as long as the domestic delivery of healthcare falls below basic standards of 
primary healthcare. As AG Colomer put it in Stamatelaki, “being a fundamental asset, health 
cannot be considered solely in terms of social expenditure and latent economic difficulties 
(…). This right is perceived as a personal entitlement, unconnected to a person’s relationship 
with social security”.73 When a Member State, in other words, does not look after the basic 
health needs of its citizens (which is an absolute normative obligation that underlies national 
healthcare policies), the free movement provisions serve to defend this normative obligation 
by making it accessible beyond the territory of the state. 
 
When, on the other hand, transboundary patient mobility is premised on the patient’s choice 
(rather than medical need), the Court is much more willing to respect domestic constraints 
that relate to the financing or planning of healthcare structures. Again, what the Court is doing 
here is insulating the normative logic that underlies the relative, aspirational, right to 
healthcare, which needs to be weighed up against the healthcare claims by other citizens. A 
commitment to this normative objective, therefore, suggests that Member States dispose of 
a significant leeway in the regulation of patients who simply prefer to be treated abroad. In a 
range of cases starting with Kohll and Decker, and recently codified in the Patients’ Rights 
Directive 2011/24, the Court will accept limitations on the rights of patients to travel freely in 
order to obtain (and be reimbursed for) healthcare when adequate healthcare was equally 
available ‘at home’.   
 
These limitations can be based on concerns for the financial74 or infrastructural75 balance 
underlying the delivery of the overall healthcare service. As such, repayment for treatment 
obtained abroad can be limited to the amount that the procedure would have cost ‘at home’, 
so that the financial resources required to run a healthcare service are not diverted abroad to 
the detriment of immobile patients in the home state. In Müller-Fauré the Court suggests that 
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the patient “can claim reimbursement of the cost of the treatment given to them only within 
the limits of the cover provided by the sickness insurance scheme in the Member State of 
affiliation”.76 Article 7 (4) of the Patients’ Rights Directive 2011/24 now codifies this financial 
limit. In other words, when healthcare abroad is obtained because of the patient’s preference 
(rather than medical need), reimbursement is conditional. The Court has also accepted a limit 
to reimbursement based on the infrastructural planning required to run a healthcare service. 
As such, it allows exceptions to the reimbursement rules where treatment is obtained abroad 
out of choice rather than need, and “requires use of highly specialised and cost-intensive 
medical infrastructure or medical equipment”.77 The logic here is that Member States are 
allowed to recoup the investment made in state-of-the-art medical infrastructure by ‘locking 
in’ the patients that require its use.  
 
These two limits to free movement can best be understood in their constitutional context. In 
cases where patients’ healthcare needs can be met at home, but they choose to be treated 
abroad, movement should not undermine healthcare access by immobile patients in the home 
state. After all, beyond the prevention of medical need, domestic healthcare policy is 
premised on a relative right to healthcare, where a patient’s right is balanced against demands 
of other patients. In a sense, the Court is insulating this normative basis of national healthcare 
policy by extending it across border without subverting its nature.  
 
Some critics have been less generous in their understanding of the Court’s engagement with 
the national health services. Their criticism comes in two flavours. On the one hand, critics 
have argued that the Court’s judgments have led to the commodification of healthcare and 
undermines the basic solidaristic premise that each citizen has equal access to healthcare on 
the sole basis of their healthcare needs. On this view, the possibility of free movement favours 
the ‘savvy’ citizen who knows that reimbursement of treatment abroad is possible, and that 
has the linguistic, legal, financial, and practical expertise to seek out healthcare treatment 
abroad and deal with the administrative burden of reclaiming expenses.78 On the other hand, 
critics have argued that certain practical and structural ways in which free movement skews 
access to healthcare for the citizens that remain at home have been overlooked by the Court. 
This is a more significant criticism from the constitutional perspective, as it suggests that the 
functioning of the free movement provisions alters the possibility to access healthcare for 
immobile citizens and – as a consequence – undermines the Member States’ commitment to 
secure adequate healthcare for its citizens. Ashiagbor, for example, highlights how EU law fails 
to respect domestic healthcare priorities, fails to control healthcare costs and the principle of 
equality between insured persons (in so far as it allows queue-jumping).79 Newdick suggests, 
more generally, that free movement law prioritises individual rights over collective interests, 
and skews the political choices underlying the management structure of healthcare80 to the 
detriment of the “less vocal, and often already underempowered, categories of citizens”.81 He 
highlights specifically the danger for the poorer Member States who – forced to pay out 
healthcare costs incurred abroad – would struggle to direct investment inward and 
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haemorrhage financial resources, leaving immobile citizens with a qualitatively poorer 
service.82  
 
It seems that these arguments are based on a misreading of the case law and its codification 
in the Patients’ Rights Directive. As discussed above, this type of negative impact on immobile 
citizens is possible only where Member States do not offer adequate primary healthcare for 
its citizens. In such a situation, forcing Member States to fully reimburse treatment abroad 
actually strengthens the normative objectives of the provision of healthcare. However, in 
situations where there is no medical need, the reimbursement pro rata of treatment abroad 
cannot possibly undermine the finances of the national healthcare service. Such an argument 
is only logically tenable if patients are expected to miraculously recover or die before being 
treated ‘at home’. In any other event, after all, the home Member States’ expenses are equal 
whether the patient is treated at home or abroad. Either way, patient mobility in the EU is 
minimal,83 as healthcare systems on the whole offer good treatment options for patients,84 
and due to “linguistic barriers, geographical distance, the costs of staying abroad and the lack 
of information about the kind of care provided”.85 It is possible, however, for free movement 
to diminish the capacity of Member States to provide adequate healthcare in more subtle 
ways. One example could be that the operation of free movement diverts substantial 
resources from strategic and immobile investment (say, cancer research) to mobile diseases 
(such as hip replacement, for which patients can move abroad). Domestic waiting lists serve 
to stabilise such allocations of resources, which free movement may thwart. If and when this 
takes place (which seems unlikely and has so far not been empirically demonstrated) there is 
an argument to suggest that the right to cross-border healthcare and its reimbursement can 
be limited to stabilise the normative commitments that underlie such healthcare planning.  
 
Even if not completely perfect, the intention of the Court in its engagement with healthcare 
is quite clear. In developing the two-tiered system of cross-border healthcare entitlements, it 
is seeking to protect the normative premise that underlies national healthcare systems – 
which makes a fundamental distinction between healthcare as need and healthcare as 
choice.86 Where a patient seeks treatment abroad out of medical need, that is, their own 
Member State cannot make good on the normative promise that underlies all Member State 
healthcare policies to protect the fundamental healthcare needs of its citizens, free 
movement law defends this normative promise. When, on the other hand, a patient seeks 
treatment abroad while adequate healthcare was available ‘at home’, free movement law 
insulates the functioning of national health systems. In constitutional terms – which see to the 
respect for both the vertical division of competences between the EU and its Member States, 
as well as the respect for the substantive choices of the domestic legislator – this case law is 
well-balanced.  
 
Gambling 
 
The division of competences in the regulation of gambling is less clear than in the other two 
policy areas reviewed. The Treaty does not mention gambling, and gambling policy typically 
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covers overlapping policy areas, ranging from internal market to public health, from consumer 
protection to the fight against organised crime. In consequence, the division of competences 
between the EU and its Member States is unclear. In practice, however, it is clear that both 
the EU and its Member States understand gambling regulation to fall within the scope of 
legislative competences of the Member States. The Commission itself (mirroring the 
assessment of the Court) suggests “Member States are in principle free to set the objectives 
of their policy on games of chance and to define in detail the level of protection sought”.87 
Instead, Union action is aimed at coordination and the fight against organised crime.88 
Presumably this has to do with the salience of the regulation of gambling – both in economic 
and in moral-cultural terms.  
 
Member State policy towards gambling, however, is as contradictory and confusing as the 
Court’s assessment of it. On first sight, both appear very straightforward. When reading the 
case law of the Court, a clear picture emerges: Member States have both social and regulatory 
concerns about gambling – which primarily focus on the need to prevent addiction and fraud 
– and the ensuing restrictions of free movement are happily accepted by the Court without 
more than a light-touch proportionality review.89 In essence, it appears that the Court is very 
sensitive to the normative ambitions that underlie domestic policies regarding gambling – a 
perfect example of how free movement ought to work in areas that fall within the 
competences of the Member States. Below the surface, however, we can trace a much more 
nuanced picture, whereby Member States base their regulatory approach to gambling 
primarily on the economic imperative of maximising tax returns, and use social and regulatory 
excuses to receive exemptions from the free movement provisions so as to achieve tax income 
maximisation. The Court, on the other hand, without explicitly acknowledging this economic 
reality, increasingly demands that the Member States take these putative social and 
regulatory risks seriously, and structure their regulatory model accordingly. This makes for a 
counterintuitive picture, whereby EU free movement law – rather than undermining the non-
economic objectives of national regulation – becomes an instrument for their enforcement.  
 
This history of gambling suggests that public authorities have always been in two minds about 
its regulation. On the one hand, gambling is thought to contribute to the perpetuation of 
‘social evils’ such as addiction, fraud, the squandering of money, mental health issues, and, 
more recently, organised crime and match-fixing. Historically, condemnation by religious 
authorities has, moreover, offered a moralistic glow to its prohibition or stringent limitation.90 
On the other hand, gambling has always been understood as a social activity, a playful act, 
and as an important source for revenue or even charity (think of church lotteries).91 With the 
technological advances of the last decades, moreover, these contradictions have become 
even more glaring. The online gambling market alone was expected to reach a size of €13 
billion by 2015, with an annual growth rate of 15% (the overall gambling market is worth €85 
billion).92 The new possibilities offered by this online industry – the unlimited availability and 
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ease of entry, increased possibility of fraud, the absence of social or medical controls of 
punters, the possibility of new forms of regulation, and most crucially the absence of the need 
of a physical shopfront – mean that these contradictions are increasingly played out through 
EU law.93        
 
An overview of Member State legislation shows a wide range of regulatory responses in the 
area of gambling – ranging from full liberalisation, to licensing systems, to state monopolies. 
Some Member States differentiate between types of bets (for example, between lotteries and 
sports betting); others between online and offline betting; and others between the types of 
activities that can be gambled on.94 The Court’s rejection of mutual recognition in this area 
means that Member States retain wide autonomy in setting their regulatory model. The EU 
legislator, at the same time, mainly focuses on consumer protection.95 It is clear that Member 
States do not regard gambling as such to be morally problematic (all Member States allow it 
to a lesser or greater extent). Rather, they understand the social or regulatory implications to 
be problematic. Whenever the regulatory approach of a Member State to gambling (both 
online and offline) is challenged on the basis of the free movement provisions, the Court has 
in principle accepted that anything short of a fully liberalised market constitutes a restriction 
to free movement. At the same time, it has also accepted a very wide range of justifications. 
Planzer summarises and lists ‘the maintenance of public order’, ‘the prevention of fraud and 
other criminal activities’, ‘the limitation of the exploitation of the human passion for 
gambling’, ‘the prevention of the damaging individual and social consequences of incitement 
to expenses’, ‘consumer protection’, ‘maintenance of social order’, ‘protection of moral and 
cultural aspects’, ‘prevention of gambling from being a source of private profit’, ‘limitation of 
the propensity of consumers to gamble’, ‘combating financial crime and money laundering’, 
‘prevention of the incitement to squander money on gambling’, ‘general need to preserve 
public order’, ‘the need to avoid private profit to be drawn from the exploitation of a social 
evil or the weakness of players and their misfortune’, and ‘fighting addition to gambling’.96 
The only justification that was explicitly rejected is the argument based on purely economic 
concerns – be it from the perspective of the gambling companies or the public purse. In 
Commission v Italy, for example, the Court explicitly held that “the need to ensure continuity, 
financial stability, and a proper return on past investments for licence holders” could not 
constitute a justification.97 In Gambelli, likewise, the Court summarily dismissed Member 
State concerns about “the diminution or reduction of tax revenue, [which] does not constitute 
a matter of overriding general interest.”98 As we will see, this rejection of economic 
considerations has great implications for the constitutional quality of the Court’s case law in 
this area. 
 
In its assessment of proportionality, finally, the Court appears very hands-off. As Van den 
Bogaert and Cuyvers put it, “each individual requirement of the test is relaxed to introduce 
some form of additional margin. For instance, overriding objectives are accepted more easily, 
the burden of proof is almost reversed, and the necessity test is virtually abolished”.99 The 
Court’s insistence on the coherence and consistency of policy design appear to be – on this 
take – an instrument to ensure that domestic regulation does not entail hidden protectionist 
intent, and offers wide normative leeway to Member States in deciding which social and 
                                                 
93 See for a particularly negative view of the impact of internet on the social problems associated with gambling. 
Case C-46/08, Carmen Media [2010] ECR I-8149, para 103.  
94 See for overview of national regulatory responses: https://gamblingcompliance.com/products/reports-trackers  
95 Commission Gambling Action Plan. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1135_en.htm  
96 Planzer, above note 89, 63-64. 
97 Case C-260/04, Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-7083, para 35.  
98 Case C-243/01, Gambelli [2003] ECR I-13031, para 61; Case C-316/07, Markus Stoβ [2010] ECR I-8069, para 105. 
99 Van den Bogaert and Cuyvers, above note 89, 1191.  
22 
 
regulatory interests to protect and how to do so.100 On the surface, then, it seems that the 
Court is very mindful of the Member State’s privilege to decide on the normative regulation 
of gambling.  
 
Below the surface, however, we can trace another dynamic. As AG Stix-Hackl had already 
suggested in Lindman, Member States are deeply ambivalent about the regulation of 
gambling: “one the one hand, because of the social risks gambling involves, States have 
traditionally felt obliged to regulate or restrict it; however, gambling is of great significance 
for the public purse, both in fiscal and in general economic terms”.101 Indeed, work by Des 
Laffey, Vincent Della Sala and Kathryn Laffey suggests that the prime driver of Member State 
regulatory stances towards gambling is the maximisation of tax revenue.102 They trace the 
regulatory changes, political discourse, and policy response in the UK and Italy over the past 
decades (as well as indicating anecdotal evidence from other Member States) and find that, 
despite different models of political economy; Member States all over the EU attempt to 
regulate gambling in a way that ‘locks in’ tax revenue.103 They term this ‘economic patriotism’, 
whereby national policy makers attempt to favour (economic) insiders in market regulation. 
A typical example in the gambling sector would be a regulation that locks in resources 
obtained by gambling (in the place of incorporation) while outsourcing the social 
consequences of gambling (which occur at the place of consumption). The example of how 
the UK’s regulatory stance has changed in the last decades is perhaps most instructive in this 
interplay between the gains and costs of socio-economic regulation. The 2005 Gambling Act 
liberalised the gambling trade in the UK, with the purpose of increasing employment, tax 
gains, and creating national champions ready to take on the global gambling market. In a 
review in 2012, this strategy appeared partially successful. The gambling market employed 
95,000 people and generated over £7 billion in revenue.104 At the same time, gambling 
addiction had gone up, and, more crucially from the UK’s perspective, 90% of the revenue was 
made by companies not established in the UK, meaning that the UK was left with the social 
costs of gambling, without the economic gains in taxation.105 In response, the Gambling Act 
2014 set a new regulatory strategy that requires all gambling providers to obtain a UK license, 
and pay 15% tax.106 This model is replicated across the continent – even if often the gambling 
products that can be offered are more restrictive than in the UK market. The objective of 
Member States is clear: they want a slice of the ever increasing gambling pie, while controlling 
for the most egregious of social ills related to this activity. Other Member States, such as Italy, 
operate a slight variation on this model, whereby licenses are given to companies that pay a 
‘reasonable amount’ of tax in Italy, whereas access to non-licensed companies is blocked.107 
The regulatory models in Germany, France, Spain, and the Netherlands are similar.108 Member 
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State regulation of gambling markets is primarily geared towards “protecting and promoting 
domestic producers, and the associated tax returns, rather than consumers”.109 
 
This peculiarity, whereby Member States disguise gambling policies that are conceived on the 
basis of their economic and fiscal effect with reference to the need to protect consumers and 
prevent fraud is a direct effect of the Court’s case law. As discussed above, the Court has never 
accepted purely economic reasons as legitimating restrictions to free movement in gambling. 
This forces Member States to justify any restriction on gambling (including a system of 
licensing, monopolies or any other limit) on grounds other than purely economic ones. The 
need to bring forward non-economic objectives – such as the combatting of addiction, the 
protection of public morality, or the fight against fraud and organised crime – in order to 
justify restrictive gambling policies that attempt to ‘lock in’ tax revenue, means that the free 
movement provisions generate a very counterintuitive effect. After all, the legality of Member 
State schemes now depends on their actual capacity to achieve these non-economic 
objectives while trying to maximise tax returns. The bias that is generally considered to be 
implicit in the free movement provisions is, in essence, turned upside down, and the Court is 
demanding that Member States take seriously the non-economic objectives that supposedly 
underlie them.  
 
In Winner Wetten, for example, the Court held that a regulatory system that granted a 
monopoly to a public body could not be justified “by reference to the alleged objective of 
preventing the encouragement of excessive spending on gambling (…) since participation in 
bets in sporting competitions is encouraged by the national bodies authorities to organise 
such bets”.110 In Pfleger, the Court was very explicit in both its demand that national court 
closely scrutinise empirical data that demonstrates how Member States intend to protect 
consumers,111 and in its rejection of any domestic policy of which “the real purpose is not the 
fight against crime and the protection of gamblers, but a mere increase of State revenue”.112 
Likewise, in Gambelli, the Court highlighted that consumer protection considerations were 
not acceptable if the Member State simultaneously encouraged consumers to participate in 
betting “to the financial benefit of the public purse”.113 This logic – of forcing Member States 
to take serious the social or regulatory objectives stated – can also be traced in more detail in 
Zeturf and Stoss. In Zeturf, the Court explicitly argued that charities – set up to prevent private 
gains being made from gambling, may have pressure to “increase opportunities for gambling 
and to attract new bettors”.114 The proportionality assessment, then, depends on whether the 
domestic regulatory model actually serves social purposes instead of exclusively serving to 
maximise tax returns. In Stoss, which dealt with a national policy seeking to channel gambling 
activities towards licensed operators (a policy which could, in principle, justify a degree of 
advertising by these licensed operators) the Court held that: “advertising cannot, however, 
aim to encourage consumers’ natural propensity to gamble by stimulating their active 
participation in it, such as by trivializing gambling or giving it a positive image due to the fact 
that revenues derived from it are used for activities in the public interest, or by increasing the 
attractiveness of gambling by means of enticing advertising messages depicting major 
winnings in glowing colours”.115 The gist of the case law of the Court is clear. Even if sometimes 
criticised for being overly moralistic in its view of gambling (seeing gamblers as weak and 
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unable to control their behaviour),116 its use of the requirement of coherence and consistency 
of the national gambling policy simply serves to hold Member States to account for their own 
decision how to frame their gambling policy.117 Any gambling policy preference – ranging from 
the complete prohibition or complete liberalisation of the gambling market, and all levels of 
regulation in between, would – on this view – be in principle completely compatible with the 
Court’s case law.  
 
What becomes apparent in the Court’s case law on gambling, then, is that the Court’s refusal 
to accept purely economic arguments for the restriction of free movement leads to the 
obligation on Member States to take the non-economic effects of gambling into account. As 
Des Laffey, Vincent Della Sala and Kathryn Laffey put it, “the tension between the competing 
discourses of market liberalization and public health concerns is more apparent than real, as 
it is the former that seems to drive the policy choices (…) ECJ decisions consistently put 
pressure on Member States to demonstrate their concerns for the social consequences of 
gambling were genuine. States had to choose between limiting gambling services for all 
providers and truly protecting consumers; or opening up markets but ensuring that conditions 
were favourable to protect consumers”.118 This counterintuitive effect of the application of 
the free movement provisions can be explained by the Court’s reluctance to allow Member 
State to impose barriers to free movement for purely economic or fiscal reasons.  
 
The constitutional effect of the case law of the Court in this area is surprising. Unlike in the 
area of labour law (where free movement subverts domestic normative aspirations) and the 
area of healthcare (where free movement defends domestic normative aspirations) in 
gambling, the Court enforces the domestic normative aspirations against the Member States. 
It is, in a sense, forcing Member States to take seriously the policy concerns that they claim 
underlie their domestic regulation of the gambling sector. This approach is not without 
problems of its own, as it generates a number of logical inconsistencies,119 and does not always 
use (the abundantly available) empirical work on the incidence of gambling disorders and 
serious fraud in order to test the accuracy of its own assumptions,120 but – from a 
constitutional perspective – offers an interesting and convincing approach in respecting both 
the division of competences between Member States and EU, and the specific regulatory and 
normative choices made on the national level.  
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the pervasive narratives in EU legal studies, that grows stronger and stronger as the 
political and social implications of EU law are studied more closely,121 is that the free 
movement provisions have significant constitutional implications. On this account, the legal 
structure of the free movement provisions has the capacity to cut through domestic (and EU-
level) political opposition, and has the potential to challenge the normative objectives of 
domestic policy domains in which the EU does not have any legislative competences itself. 
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This is problematic, in turn, not only because it does not respect the vertical balance of 
competences between the EU and the Member States, but also because the decisions as to 
the normative values that ought to structure the internal market (as well as the values that 
ought to be rejected) are decided by EU judicial actors, rather than domestic political actors. 
In consequence, many authors have argued that the solution to counter this process lies in 
changing the structural properties that allow the free movement provisions to have this 
pervasive effect of dislocating domestic democratic preferences. In other words, these 
authors suggests that a constitutionally more appropriate understanding of free movement 
can be secured by altering the framework through which the Court adjudicates cases on free 
movement.  
 
This article adds to that discussion by highlighting that context matters. Understanding the 
constitutional quality of the case law of the Court in free movement requires us to look at the 
constitutional position of that policy area as well as at the effect of adjudication on policy 
choices. In short, this entails that if a policy area falls outside the scope of legislative 
competences of the EU, the Court ought to protect the policy objectives articulated in national 
legislation. Just looking at the legal structure of the Court, therefore, only tells us part of the 
constitutional story. The structure of the legal reasoning of the Court in, say, Elchinov or Laval 
is very similar (it insists on strict proportionality) yet the outcome of these cases in terms of 
its constitutional implications is radically different. As discussed above, while the Court in the 
former case protects domestic policy preferences, in the latter it subverts them. A genuinely 
constitutional reading of the case law of the Court in free movement, therefore, needs to 
focus more closely on whether or not the Court respects the division of legislative 
competences between the EU and its Member States and whether it respects the policy 
preferences of the legislator.  
 
What this more contextual approach entails will, obviously, depend on the policy area at issue. 
This contribution has looked at three policy areas addressed by the case law on Article 56 
TFEU in order to offer examples of what a contextual reading makes of the case law of the 
Court. This analysis suggests that the Court is more successful in some policy areas than others 
in discharging its constitutional task in an appropriate manner. The three policy areas 
reviewed (labour law, healthcare, and gambling) offer a range of different outcomes. The 
substantive regulation of all three policy areas falls within the competences of the Member 
States. Yet, the Court has not always respected this constitutional division of competences. In 
labour law, the Court’s understanding of free movement subverts, or at least challenges, the 
Member States’ capacity to meet its normative objectives. In the area of healthcare, on the 
other hand, the Court’s understanding of free movement protects the central distinction 
between healthcare as need and as choice that lies at the normative core of all Member State 
healthcare systems. In the area of gambling, finally, the Court’s case law has the 
counterintuitive effect of forcing Member States to live by its own normative objectives. In 
this area, the free movement provisions become an instrument to police that Member States 
take their normative objectives underlying the regulation of gambling seriously.  
 
The findings in this article come with two main implications. The institutional implication is 
that the Court must become considerably more explicit and more sensitive in contextualising 
the norms of free movement in reference to the effects that they produce. This means that – 
in areas falling outside the legislative competences of the EU – the Court must be more 
deferential to national policy ambitions. Discovering those ambitions is a task that courts, both 
on the national and European level, routinely undertake; and in which they pay attention to 
the wording of pieces of legislation as much as to the wider policy context. It also means that 
the Court must be creative and flexible in its understanding of free movement. What matters 
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is not that a certain level of coherence is achieved across the case law of the Court in free 
movement, but within specific and discrete policy areas. This may mean – depending on the 
policy context – changing the scope of application of the free movement provisions, the 
nature of the principle of proportionality, or reversing the burden of proof. It may seem odd 
to allow the Court this margin of manoeuvre in structuring its case law on free movement, 
partially as the functioning of the Union’s judicial system depends on a level of predictability 
and certainty for national administrations and courts. At the same time, such margin is the 
only way in which the Court can remain sensitive to the very distinct and diverse policy context 
that the free movement provisions touch upon – ranging from gambling to blood donation; 
from education to the regulation of fireworks or vitamin supplements. What matters, 
primarily, is the protection of the (Member State or EU) legislator’s policy preferences, not 
the way in which this is achieved. The possible ensuing threat to legal certainty should also 
not be overstated: the Court’s case law is already radically different in, say, healthcare 
compared to gambling. As long as the case law remains coherent within a specific policy 
domain, predictability of application for national administrative and judicial institutions is 
ensured.  
 
The second, more constitutional implication of the approach advocated in this article is to 
alter the balance between law and politics in the process of integration. It would allow political 
institutions (on the EU and national level) to articulate the values that ought to inform the EU 
and its internal market – whereas the role of the Court would be to ensure absence of 
discrimination in the implementation of those values. How the Court can respect such political 
choices while at the same time preventing protectionism will require, as discussed above, a 
degree of creativity from the Court. But, as we discovered in the areas of gambling and 
healthcare, the Court is more than able to achieve this. Such a more deferential approach by 
the Court in managing the free movement provisions would serve the constitutional 
objectives defended in this article: on the one hand it would respect and reflect the division 
of competences between the EU and its Member States, which, in turn, reflect a commitment 
to political self-determination. On the other hand, it would ensure that the values that inform 
the socio-economic European space are articulated through a (political) process that can 
legitimise them; and that reflect the needs, aspirations, and values of the European citizenry.  
